Guardian Angels Philippines
Alliance of Guardian Angels InternationalArchive for Global Issue
GUARDIAN ANGELS POLICE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND ORDER PROGRAMS
The Guardian Angels maintained a close cooperation with the Police Leadership in Philippines. Proper coordination, courtesy and respect is a mutual relation established to effectively promote Guardian Angels Role Model Cop Program. Local Chief of Police who undergoes the Guardian Angels program becomes recipient of top national awards such LEAD PNP Search, National Municipal and City Police Stations top awardee had been achieved thru partnership with the Guardian Angels.






Global Update
Perceived Neighborhood Crime and the Impact of Private Securit
08/08/08 New Found Article
Lloyd Klein
Joan Luxenburg
Marianna King
Citizens and businesses have generally rejected the expectation that criminal justice authorities can successfully achieve their delegated responsibility of protecting life and property. These people have employed alternative measures in securing desired safety from criminal victimization. This article focuses upon the following concerns: (1) the growth and impact of private security, (2) the significance of private policing as reflected in citizen attitudes toward crime prevention measures, (3) the model implementation of private security in an urban community, and (4) alternatives as reflected by the impact of the Guardian Angels and other citizen patrol efforts in anticrime programs versus the employment of private security firms. Read Access
US Recruiting for Cyber Warfare
The U.S. military is looking for a few good geeks
“This building will be attacked 3 million times today,” announces the commentator as the Pentagon appears on an ad available on the popular video site YouTube (GOOG). “Who is going to protect it? Meet Staff Sergeant Lee Jones, Air Force Cyber Command, a member of America’s only cyber command protecting us from millions of cyber threats every day.” Read Full details.
Israel’s Uncertain
Strategic Future
LOUIS RENÉ BERES
Full Read… israel1.pdf
Israel’s Strategic Future: The Final Report of Project Daniel” was completed in mid-January 2003, several months before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and transmitted by hand to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The underlying rationale of “Project Daniel” was the presumption that Israel urgently needs a coherent plan for dealing with existential threats, and that we (The Group) were well-positioned intellectually and professionally to propose such a plan. The project was originally based on an overriding concern for the possible fusion of certain weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-capacity with irrational adversaries. Project Daniel concluded, however, that the primary threats to Israel’s physical survival were more likely to come from enemies that were not irrational. With this in mind, the members of our study group proceeded to consider a broad variety of complex issues related to deterrence, defense, preemption, and war-fighting.
Tentacles of Jihad:
Targeting Transnational
Support Networks
SHAWN BRIMLEY
Full Read… brimley.pdf
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report begins with a statement of strategic clarity: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”1 From the suburbs and cities of North America and Europe, to the deserts, jungles, and villages of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, the “long war” is indeed a global one that has been and will continue to be a challenge for the professionals tasked with waging it. This war is characterized by its transnational nature, and although our military forces are heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be vigilant in our appreciation of the breadth and depth of the strategic battleground. One gets a sense of the magnitude of the challenge by examining the service and support mechanisms of al Qaeda and its progeny.
Measuring Effectiveness
in Irregular Warfare
Full read …. clancy.pdf
Regardless of the near-term effects of America’s efforts in Iraq and the global war on terrorism, one unmistakable fact has become apparent. The style of warfare for which we prepared ourselves in the post-Vietnam era, namely traditional force-on-force engagements waged within a finite campaign, is not as likely to occur as irregular-style Long War conflicts. One worrisome consequence is that the decisions on which the United States bases equipment acquisition and constructs operational planning over the next decade are dependent upon traditional warfare-style analysis. Our tools, models, and even the methodologies for assessing success are biased toward measuring physical effects on near-peer forces, played out over the days or months of a maneuver and attrition campaign.











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